Introduction
At least in theory, the American criminal justice system is designed to ensure that innocent men and women are not wrongfully convicted for crimes that they did not commit. Constitutional and procedural safeguards abound. American citizens enjoy the right to a jury trial, the right to remain silent upon questioning by the state, the right to legal counsel, the right to examine all of the state's evidence before trial, the right to cross-examine opposing witnesses, as well as an overarching right to due process. Convicted prisoners also have the right to challenge a conviction if any constitutional rights were denied during trial, and also to seek clemency from the executive authority of the jurisdiction in which they were convicted.
Despite these safeguards, defense lawyers and civil liberties advocates have been arguing for years that the American legal system is in fact fundamentally unfair and unjust. Because of power and resource imbalances, federal and state prosecutors win convictions against individuals who did not commit the crimes for which they were on trial. As a result, thousands of actually innocent people may be languishing in prisons and death rows around the country (Bedau and Radelet 1987; Borchard 1932; Gross et al. 2005; Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam 1992; Radin 1964; Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer 2000) . 224 In the past, such claims were difficult to prove, primarily because of the degradation of evidence, both physical and eyewitness, and the fundamental belief in the correctness of legal decision making (Bedau and Radelet 1987; Berger 2004) . However, forensic DNA analysis is increasingly being used in postconviction litigation to prove that innocent people have been wrongfully incarcerated (Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer 2000) . More than a decade and more than 250 exonerations later, 1 Still, the decisions of our criminal courts are considered to be final unless a defendant's constitutional rights were violated at trial. In a landmark 1993 case, Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court ruled that even the "actual innocence" of a prisoner (i.e., the fact that the person did not commit the crime for which he was convicted) was not sufficient to necessitate the reversal of a conviction. Rather, it could only serve as the "gateway though which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits" (Herrera 1993, 404) . In other words, the Herrera majority found that the weak but widely distributed right of all Americans to legal finality and repose (the notion expressed by Justice Harlan in Mackey) outweighs a defendant's narrowly 225 distributed, individual right to absolute certainty in legal decisions (the notion expressed above by Blackstone), as long as no constitutional violations led to the conviction.
Herrera raised significant legal challenges for defense lawyers hoping to use DNA test results to vacate the convictions of their clients. In many states, defense lawyers gained postconviction access to biological evidence through legislation, ad hoc agreements with prosecutors, and other legal processes.
However, a major complaint made by the community seeking to overturn wrongful convictions is that there is no fail-safe right to DNA testing throughout the country. ordinarily use to deny access to biological evidence in the name of finality and social stability. This demand is based on the claim that DNA evidence has the power to provide "cast iron scientific proof," whereas our system convicts and sentences innocent people on a regular basis based on flawed forensic evidence and unreliable eyewitness testimony (Leahy 2001 
Postconviction Relief
Although a convicted prisoner can seek postconviction relief by several avenues, the most important is the writ of habeas corpus, which allows a prisoner to bring the authorities imprisoning him or her before a court of law to test the legality (constitutionality) of his conviction. In a series of cases over several decades, the U.S. Supreme Court established that the sole purpose of habeas corpus review is to test the constitutionality of a conviction, not to review its underlying factual 231 basis. In other words, no matter how much a prisoner may wish to prove his or her innocence, the prisoner has no absolute right to do so after being convicted. Two recent developments in habeas law are especially relevant to the use of DNA evidence in postconviction relief: the Supreme Court's decisions in Herrera and v. Delo (1995) ; and the passage of the federal Antiterrorism and Effective
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Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 4 Herrera, which involved the 1981 shooting deaths of two Texas highway patrolmen during a traffic stop, was decided just before postconviction DNA testing became an important part of the debate about the fairness and efficacy of the American criminal justice system. Leonel Herrera was arrested soon after the shootings based on a wide range of evidence, including eyewitness testimony, the fact that his girlfriend owned the car that had been stopped, serological data that matched blood on his pants to the one of the slain officers, as well as a handwritten note found in Herrera's pocket at the time of arrest strongly implying that he had committed the crime. In January 1982, Herrera was found guilty of murdering the second officer and was sentenced to death. Six months later, he pled guilty to the murder of the first officer, and unsuccessfully appealed the first conviction on the ground that some of the evidence was improperly admitted. He subsequently filed petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief, both of which were denied.
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More than eight years later, Herrera filed a second petition for state habeas corpus relief, and then for federal habeas relief, this time based on what he considered to be important new information not available at the first trial: two affidavits claiming that Herrera's now dead brother was the true perpetrator of the crimes. The District Court granted his request for a stay of execution so that this new evidence could be analyzed in court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, vacated the stay, stating that the existence of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner was not a ground for federal habeas corpus relief. Herrera appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court, which upheld the appellate decision.
In a At the heart of Herrera was a question of what to do with newly discovered evidence that could support or refute the validity of a guilty verdict.
The Herrera majority held that for newly discovered evidence to lead to postconviction relief, it must reasonably have been unavailable at the initial trial, and it must also accompany a violation of constitutional rights. Thus, Herrera established that newly discovered evidence can matter only if it is linked to a constitutional violation. The main justifications for this conclusion were that "the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications," and therefore that evidence based on affidavits alone evidence would not be powerful enough to guarantee a more exact finding of guilt or innocence if Herrera were to receive a new trial. 5 This view was codified by the passage of ADPEA in 1996, together with the requirement that habeas corpus relief must be applied for within one year after conviction in state court. into question (51-58). Thus, the debate among the justices was not about the absolute veracity of the DNA evidence, but only about its relevance to the total evidentiary picture of guilt and premeditation.
Schlup v. Delo
In a 5-3 ruling (Justice Alito was not yet a member when oral arguments were heard), the court determined that House's petition for postconviction relief was viable and granted him a new trial. Despite the heavy media focus on the DNA evidence in the months leading up to the oral arguments, the majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, did not single out DNA evidence as the determining factor in justifying relief. Instead, the majority argued that the three pieces of new evidence, taken in totality, suggested that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole would lack reasonable doubt" about House's guilt (House 2006, 545) . For the dissenters, this was the wrong standard to apply. In their view, new evidence must not merely cast doubt on House's conviction; it had to prove "that House was actually innocent, so that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence"
(548).
The Purification of DNA Profiling
The argument that a convicted felon has a constitutional right to DNA evidence even after he has exhausted all legal remedies rests squarely on the idea that DNA 238 testing serves as a "truth machine" that can definitively determine guilt or innocence beyond doubt. Both Peter Neufeld, a noted liberal, and former U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, a noted conservative, have characterized the technique in this way (Neufeld 2003, 33; Ashcroft 2002) . Since its first introduction as a forensic technique, DNA evidence has been endowed with almost mythic infallibility both by prosecutors using it to put defendants behind bars and by defense attorneys using it to free the wrongfully convicted from The comparison of DNA testing to the telescope is revealing. As the historian of science Simon Schaffer has shown, when the telescope was introduced into astronomy, the visual data it produced were often highly ambiguous, leading to multiple interpretations among scientists. Further, many lay people simply did not trust an implement like the telescope to provide them with an accurate portrait of stars as they "really" were. Viewers had to be trained both 239 to interpret the imperfect images created by the telescope and to believe that they actually represented reality (Schaffer 1983 (Schaffer , 1989 ). In the same way, Scheck and
Neufeld actively campaigned to convince judges, prosecutors, politicians, and the public that DNA was a revelation machine for exposing the faults of the criminal justice system that were not immediately obvious or apparent to most people To be fair, Scheck and Neufeld had long argued that although DNA evidence was problematic when used for incrimination, it could be reliably used for exculpatory purposes, because no population genetics data were needed. A nonmatch requires no statistical interpretation. This view, however, ignored the ever present problems of contamination, degradation of forensic DNA samples, chain of custody issues, and lab misconduct. By carefully reviewing the circumstances of each case before accepting it, however, the Innocence Project rarely has to discuss these potential problems with DNA evidence publicly. The
The Innocence Project
Innocence Project makes no secret of the fact that it accepts only those cases in which DNA evidence can yield conclusive proof of actual innocence. 7 In doing so, Innocence Project lawyers manage the image of DNA in the postconviction context so that there can be no question of its truth-telling power. The Innocence
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Project owes its success to this continuous purification of DNA profiling from its problematic social matrix.
A Fundamental Right to DNA Testing?
For many in the defense community, DNA profiling is so much stronger than other forms of evidence that it overrides traditional arguments about the sanctity of procedural finality in our legal system. If a DNA test can definitively adjudicate guilt or innocence, then it would be a constitutional violation, so the defense argument runs, to deny prisoners access to postconviction DNA testing. However, because Herrera effectively blocked a prisoner's ability to obtain postconviction DNA testing to prove actual innocence, defense attorneys have had to pursue other legal avenues to gain access to biological materials for analysis (Neufeld and Tofte 2005, 189 In the criminal context, this may mean seeking compensation for unconstitutional treatment or demanding access to services or protections not provided by the state.
In , James Harvey, a Virginia prisoner convicted of rape, sought a constitutional right of access to DNA evidence under §1983.
This kind of challenge differs from a petition for habeas corpus in that a successful outcome neither secures the release nor proves the actual innocence of a convicted prisoner. At best, it can provide access to evidence that might establish actual innocence. Two central aspects of a §1983 suit are that the evidence is never automatically exculpatory, as test results could show that the DNA sample from the crime scene matches the plaintiff, and even if the evidence is exculpatory, the plaintiff must still file for habeas corpus or ask for a pardon in order to be released from prison. In other words, a §1983 suit must not seek to 244 overturn a conviction, and it cannot be seen as bypassing state courts-it can only ask for evidence that the state is unwilling to hand over to the defendant for testing due to some legal or procedural defect.
Harvey originated in 1996, when the Innocence Project asked the Virginia Division of Forensic Science to hand over biological evidence for retesting. They asked again in 1998 and 1999, but their requests were denied. Harvey subsequently argued that the state's failure to test biological evidence using the latest Short Tandem Repeat (STR)-based DNA profiling technology violated his due process rights. 9 The federal district court hearing the case acknowledged such a right based on Brady, and also accepted that his claim was not for a writ of habeas corpus because he was not seeking immediate release from prison.
Commonwealth Attorney Horan appealed this ruling.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court decision, arguing in part that Harvey had not followed the proper procedure in making his claim for postconviction relief. The court stated that a prisoner could bring a §1983 claim only after the conviction or sentence is "reversed, expunged, In other words, the court acknowledged that although finality is not a value that trumps all others, it can be overridden only in cases in which radically new evidence is discovered after trial.
In Harvey, the Fourth Circuit staked out a very conservative position with regard to the law's obligation to keep up with developing science and technology.
As far as this court was concerned, the legal system has a valid, well-established 246 mechanism for discovering the facts of a case that is not intrinsically inferior to scientific methods of truth making. In the interest of justice, already settled cases should not be reopened simply because some new scientific technique could potentially provide additional information not originally available at trial. In a society of seemingly continuous scientific change, doing so would mean that all judicial decisions would become provisional-never finished, always open to relitigation (Harvey 2002a, 375-376) .
This argument implicitly denies the theory of the law lag-the idea that the legal system takes a long time to take notice of, understand, and come to grips with rapidly evolving science-and that it has an obligation to do better.
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According to Fourth Circuit, the legal system has no duty to continually readjudicate old cases by the newest science; it must simply seek to ensure that the best available contemporary science is used at the time that the case is initially Luttig found this reasoning faulty in light of the power of DNA-based technology to establish truth. He believed that the advances that led to DNA testing were "no ordinary developments, even for science." As a result, they could 248 not be treated as "ordinary developments for law." Instead, they "must be recognized for the singularly significant developments that they are-in the class of cases for which they actually can prove factual innocence, the evidentiary equivalent of 'watershed' rules of constitutional law" (Harvey 2002b, 305-306) .
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After pointing out that the right to DNA testing must be tightly managed so as not to overwhelm the criminal justice system with spurious claims of innocence, Luttig stated that "it would be a high credit to our system of justice that it recognizes the need for, and imperative of, a safety valve in those rare instances where objective proof that the convicted actually did not commit the offense later becomes available through the progress of science" (306). 12 For Luttig, then, the law has an overriding duty to incorporate objective truth, and hence to defer to the exceptional truth-telling capability of DNA profiling. 2010) . In Osborne's case, the court was "reluctant to hold that Alaska law offers no remedy to defendants who could provide their factual innocence," and therefore devised a three-part test for access to biological evidence based on policies deemed to exist in other states (Osborne 2005b, 995) . In order to gain access to biological evidence, Osborne's request had to satisfy the following criteria: (1) the original conviction had to rest primarily on eyewitness identification, (2) there had to be doubt in the identification of Osborne by the witness, and (3) any evidence produced had to be conclusively exculpatory.
Osborne did not pass this test because numerous other forms of evidence were presented at trial, including a gun found in Osborne's car that matched shell casings recovered by police at the crime scene. He was therefore denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, denying that any due process violation occurred. Alaska, the court noted, had a legitimate framework for postconviction relief that, however imperfect, did not "offend" fundamental principles of justice or fairness (District Attorney's Office v. Osborne 2009, 16 ).
This, in the majority's view, would be the only basis for upsetting a state's postconviction relief procedures. More to the point, the Supreme Court also rejected Osborne's plea to recognize a freestanding right to DNA testing in the absence of some constitutional error at trial, because they felt this was a matter for legislatures to deal with (1) (2) . In the majority's view, articulated by Chief Justice
Roberts, "there is no reason to constitutionalize the issue in this way" (2) . Relying 251 on Wilkinson's reasoning in Harvey, Roberts argued that "the availability of technologies not available at trial cannot mean that every criminal conviction, or even every criminal conviction involving biological evidence, is suddenly in doubt. The dilemma is how to harness DNA's power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal justice" (8) .
Although the four dissenting justices argued that the benefits of absolute certainty provided by this revolutionary new technique outweighed the risks associated with violating the established legal order, the majority countered that "there is no long history of such a right and the mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that substantive due process sustains it" (19).
The majority also took aim at the very notion that served as the foundation for calls to constitutionalize a right to postconviction DNA testing-that modern STR analysis can provide conclusive proof of guilt or innocence in an efficient, low-cost manner. Taking a page from Scheck and Neufeld's old playbook, the majority adopted a skeptical view of the certainty accorded to DNA profiling. 
Conclusion
The We may give Luttig the last word with respect to the ideal relationship between legal procedure and scientific techniques-or between social finality and 254 epistemic certainty-in meting out justice. In his criticism of the decision not to rehear Harvey's postconviction case, Luttig wrote that if "it is agreed that, in a given class of cases, it would be possible to establish to a certainty through such further analysis that one did not in fact commit the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced, then grave harm would come to the Constitution were it to be dismissively interpreted as foreclosing access to such evidence under any and all circumstances and for any and all purposes (judicial or even executive).
The Constitution is not so static" (Harvey 2002b, 306) .
In the end, we can conclude that both finality (just process) and certainty (DNA typing) are important social achievements. In addition to safeguarding the rights of the defendants and preserving social order, the legal must system should endeavor to ensure that neither value gets elevated to the status of a false god.
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